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1.  Introduction 
It is well documented that in many health systems medical services are ra-
tioned by waiting lists rather than prices (Lindsay and Feigenbaum 1984, 
Cullis and Jones 1986). In times of rationed medical supply, waiting lists 
discriminate between urgent and less urgent needs of treatment, but also 
between profitable and costly patients. Often holders of private health in-
surance (PHI) pay either more for equal services or have access to more 
innovative and costly treatments not available to holders of statutory health 
insurance (SHI) or those without any insurance (Lüngen et al. 2008, Krobot 
et al. 2004). Thus, discriminating between PHI and SHI patients is poten-
tially profitable for providers of medical services. Indeed, empirical results 
show that private insurees benefit from better access to medical care includ-
ing shorter waiting times (Asplin et al. 2005, Ward et al. 2008).  
The main objective of this paper is to assess the impact of PHI versus SHI 
on offeredwaiting times until medical treatment within German acute care 
hospitals. To this aim, we requested individual appointments from hospitals 
within an experimental study design, which allows for causal inferences of 
PHI versus SHI on waiting times (Asplin et al. 2005). Further, we assess the 
association between observed hospital characteristics, such as the hospitals 
financial performance and ownership form, and the discrimination in wait-
ing times between PHI and SHI holders. 
Empirical literature has shown that waiting times for medical appointments 
are strongly related to profit considerations of the providers of medical ser-
vices. Studies using US data found that a decrease in remuneration for the 
treatment  of  Medicare  patients  led  to  an  increase  in  their  waiting  times 
(Resneck et al. 2004). Medicaid patients were shown to have higher waiting 
times than privately insured patients, who pay more for equal treatments 
(Asplin et al. 2005, MASG 1994). In German ambulatory care, where the 
remuneration for treating private policyholders is on average 20-35% higher 
than for treatments of statutory insurees, the difference in waiting time be-
tween  these  patient types amounts  to  300%  (Lüngen  et  al. 2008).  These 
studies confirm that discrimination by insurance type occurs be it in ambula-
tory or stationary care, within different health system designs and different 
types  of  health  insurances.  Moreover,  they  indicate  that  this  behavior  is 
motivated by financial incentives. Our study provides first-time empirical 
evidence of the discrimination in  waiting times within the German acute 
care hospital sector. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents key features of the 
regulatory framework of health insurance and its impact on patient selection 
within the German acute care health sector. Section 3 describes the data. 5  Waiting Times for Holders of Private versus Social Health Insurance 
Section  4  specifies  the  estimation  strategy,  while  results  are  described  in 
section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2.  The role of health insurance in the German hospital sector 
Before 2004 acute care hospitals in Germany acted under a cost-plus reim-
bursement system. This changed in 2004 after introduction of the Prospec-
tive Payment System (PPS), creating strong incentives for economic disci-
pline in the hospital sector. Under PPS hospitals get a fixed payment for the 
treatment of each patient in a diagnosis-related group (DRG), regardless of 
the actual costs incurred by the care of the patient.
2 A large literature docu-
ments  hospitals’  responses  in  introducing  cost-saving  or  reimbursement-
increasing measures under PPS. These measures include decreases in the 
length of stay (Cutler 1995), selective reductions in expenditures for high-
cost patients (Meltzer and Chung 2002), upcoding
3 (Dafny 2005) and selec-
tion of profitable patients (Ellis 1998). Due to the regulatory framework of 
health insurance in Germany, the insurance status is a potential indicator for 
a profitable selection of patients. The main regulations shall be shortly de-
scribed in the following. 
In  Germany,  PHI  is  only  available  to  some  segments  of  society,  namely 
civil-servants, self-employed and individuals with an annual income above  
48.150 €. The rest of society is covered by compulsory SHI (Specke 2005). 
The cost of holding a PHI depends on morbidity and age. Therefore, one 
finds  individuals  with  a  lower  morbidity  rate  to  self-select  into  PHI  and 
those with a higher morbidity rate to choose SHI which does not base pre-
miums on the individual risk characteristics. Consequently, PHI holders are 
on average healthier and have a higher income than SHI holders (Kriwy and 
Mielck 2006). Moreover, with higher income private insurees are more sen-
sitive towards high waiting times than SHI holders, because their opportu-
nity  cost  of  waiting  (which  may  be  foregone  income  or  leisure  time)  is 
higher (Besley et al. 1999, Johannesson et al. 1998). In contrast, when given 
the choice between a high waiting time at a local hospital and a low waiting 
time at a more distant hospital, SHI holders often prefer the first option 
(Tai et al. 2004). The stronger preference of private insurees for low waiting 
                                                           
2 In reality prices are not 100% fix. Prices are fixed within an upper and lower boundary of 
the length of stay of the patient, in order to account for less (more) cost-intensive in-(out-)liers. 
Moreover, special compensation rules apply if hospitals exceed or fall below the number of 
patient cases that was agreed upon with insurance companies.  
3  Upcoding  refers  to  switching  patients  from  appropriate  lower-paying  to  higher-paying 
DRGs in order to inflate reimbursement.   6  Christoph Schwierz, Ansgar Wübker and Björn A. Kuchinke 
times puts pressure on hospitals to lower their waiting times, in order not to 
loose them to competing hospitals.  
Further, the treatment of PHI holders can generate additional remuneration 
not available in basic SHI.
4 These are hotel-benefits (private rooms), more 
costly treatment by the chief physician and access to innovative and costly 
treatment methods.
5 In addition, even without coverage of additional hospi-
tal services, private insurees might generate lower costs of treatment given 
the  same  reimbursement  due  to  their  better  health  status  and  therefore 
probably faster recovery and shorter lengths of stay.  
In short, there are arguments why positive discrimination of PHI versus SHI 
holders may pay-off for a hospital in Germany: the probability that PHI 
holders  have  low  morbidity  rates,  additional  income  sources  for  treating 
PHI patients and the aversion of PHI patients towards high waiting times.  
3.  Data 
3.1  Hospital characteristics 
We use a densified measure of the financial performance of hospitals: the 
probability of default (PD) of an enterprise within one year. This has been 
estimated  and  provided  by  Augurzky  et  al.  (2009).  The  yearly  PDs  are 
evaluated on the basis of balance sheets and profit and loss statements from 
acute care hospitals by the use of a rating tool.
6 Augurzky’s et al. (2009) PDs 
are derived from 311 balance sheets from the years 2001 to 2005 and cover-
ing 435 or 24% of all hospitals situated in Germany in 2006. On average, the 
sample includes bigger hospitals, slightly overrepresents hospitals of private 
ownership and mirrors well the regional distribution of hospitals on the level 
of  the  German  Federal  States.
7  The  total  PD  in  the  sample  amounts  to 
                                                           
4 SHI holders can voluntarily purchase supplementary private insurance to cover additional 
hospital services. Currently 5.1 Million (7.1 %) of SHI-Insurees chose this option (Verband der 
privaten Krankenversicherung e.V. 2007).  
5 In 2006 the additional remuneration due to hotel benefits and treatment by the chief physi-
cian amounted to 2.5 bill. €, or 4% of total hospital revenues. For a one-bed room the revenue 
amounted to 82,61 Euro per day, which is around 2.4% of average costs per patient in 2006 
(GBE 2008). 
6 The evaluation of the PD is based on key operating figures, such as liquidity, the debt to 
equity ratio or current assets. See Augurzky et al. (2009) for a more detailed description of the 
data and the model. 
7 The number of hospitals is higher than the number of balance sheets due to the inclusion 
of hospital chains. These provide only one balance sheet for all hospitals in a chain. We do not 
consider purely psychiatric hospitals in our sample. See also Augurzky et al. (2009). 7  Waiting Times for Holders of Private versus Social Health Insurance 
1.31%. On average, public hospitals have a PD of 1.52%, private-not-for-
profits 0.98% and private for-profits 1.47%. As a rough categorization credi-
tors regard companies with a PD up to 1.00% as creditworthy. These com-
panies are normally able to take up loans with relatively low costs. With a 
PD in the range of 1.00% - 2.60% obtaining a credit becomes more difficult 
and more costly, but is usually still possible. PDs above 2.60% suggest great 
difficulties up to the impossibility to borrow money. 
We merge the yearly PD and with hospital-level and regional-level data in 
order to control for observed heterogeneity across hospitals as well as for 
common market characteristics. On the hospital-level these are the owner-
ship form of the hospital (private for-profit, private not-for-profit, public), 
hospital size measured in the number of beds and the year of the balance 
sheet  information.  Regional-level  data  account  for  the  levels  of  capacity 
utilization by ownership type and the amount of public subsidies in the hos-
pital sector on the level of the German Federal States. Finally, we add a 
dummy distinguishing East from West German hospitals. The variables are 
described in the appendix in Table A1.  
3.2  Waiting times 
Data on waiting times for appointments at acute care hospitals in Germany 
was not available prior to this study. Therefore, it was collected following an 
experimental  study  design,  as  proposed  by  Asplin  et  al.  (2005).  Trained 
graduate students, who posed as  patients, called  hospitals using  standard 
interview questions and data collection forms with the aim of obtaining an 
appointment for a doctoral consultation. During the call the interviewers 
had to make clear that they already went through a thorough medical check 
by an ambulatory doctor in short period before the request for appointment, 
such that their diagnosis was already established.
8 An important aspect of 
our experimental design of the study was to keep insurance status exoge-
nous to waiting times. For this purpose the interviewers were told not to 
actively communicate their insurance type. Only upon request by the per-
sonnel of the hospital the interviewers presented themselves as SHI holders. 
Hospitals actively requesting the insurance type were then recalled for a 
second time within a few days after the first call.
9 During the second call the 
                                                           
8 Usually patients obtain appointments through the ambulatory health sector. The gate-
keeper, i.e. the house doctor, provides his patients with an appointment for a hospital stay. In 
order to directly obtain an appointment, our interviewers told the hospital personnel that they 
had to abstain from a routine referral by their doctors due to a recent tenancy changeover to a 
new hometown. 
9 The average lag between first and second call was 7 days. The lag was meant to be kept 
short in order to minimize the risk that a sudden change in capacity utilization of a hospital 
significantly impacts on waiting times. Where possible, in order to prevent the interviewer from 8  Christoph Schwierz, Ansgar Wübker and Björn A. Kuchinke 
anonymous interviewer claimed to be privately insured. Hospitals not ask-
ing for the insurance type were not recalled. The interviewers obtained in-
formation on whether an appointment was consented to or refused, what 
the waiting time in days until the appointment was and on which day of the 
week the call was made. Upon attainment, all appointments were cancelled 
in order not to bind  hospital capacity. The calls were randomly spanned 
over the weekdays (Monday to Friday) in 2007. 
Three clinical conditions were selected by a medical practitioner before the 
interviews  conditional  on  two  attributes.
10  First,  they  should  not  be  life-
threatening or being declared as emergency cases, but should necessitate a 
medical treatment within short notice (maximum two weeks) in order not to 
result in otherwise avoidable detrimental health effects. Second, they should 
be treatable within the sample of hospitals for which data on hospital char-
acteristics was readily available. The chosen conditions are Weber B Frac-
ture, cervical conization and stenosis. Weber B Fracture is a fracture of the 
ankle joint treated operatively in surgical departments. Cervical conization 
is an operative treatment in gynecology departments, when cancer is sus-
pected. Stenosis is a constriction of the coronary vessels treated by a stent 
implantation in cardiology departments.
11  Hospitals which had more than 
one of the departments in question, received calls to each of the depart-
ments. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the number of appointments ac-
quired as well as the waiting times obtained by several subsamples. In the 
left part of the table, statistics for all appointments are shown. In the right 
part  of  the  table,  the  subsample  of  all  the  remaining  appointments  after 
matching waiting times to hospital characteristics is presented. During the 
study period a total of 751 appointments from 531 hospitals was obtained. 
Matching waiting times with other observable characteristics of hospitals, 
such as their financial performance, leads to a reduction of the sample to 
498 observations. Only 27 calls ended without successfully obtaining an ap-
pointment, either because the clinic did not provide treatment for the se-
lected clinical condition or because the clinic did not answer the phone or 
because, in very few cases, the clinic did not provide an appointment be-
cause it was fully-booked for the next weeks to come.  
                                                                                                                                     
being re-identified by the personnel of the hospital, second calls were done, by different inter-
viewers. Furthermore, caller identification for all outgoing calls was blocked. 
10 We thank Dr. med. Lüder Herzog from the Dresdner Hospital for his help in the selection 
of the appropriate clinical conditions. 
11  The  four-digit  codes  within  the  International  Classification  of  Diagnoses  in  its  10
th-
German Modification are “S82.6” for Weber B Fracture, “I25.1” for stenosis and “C53.9” for 
cervical conisation. 9  Waiting Times for Holders of Private versus Social Health Insurance 
 
Table 1   





with matched data 
  Obs.  Mean  SD
1  Obs.  Mean  SD 
Total number of calls  751 (531)
2  5.88  5.33  498 (326)  6.15  5.72 
  Appointments  724 (504)  5.88  5.33  498 (326)  6.15  5.72 
Insurance not asked for  398 (341)  5.76  4.61  248 (201)  5.26  6.25 
Insurance asked for  326 (163)  6.55  5.52  250 (125)  7.04  5.32 
  PHI holder  163  5.10  5.14  125   5.69  4.33 
  SHI holder  163  8.00  5.90  125  8.39  5.87 
Weber B Fracture  213 (189)  1.77  3.08  133 (118)  2.09  3.32 
Insurance not asked for  163 (163)  1.65  2.83  103 (103)  1.83  2.87 
Insurance asked for  50 (25)  2.16  3.83  36 (18)  2.82  4.35 
  PHI holder  25  0.88  1.76  18  1.17  2.01 
  SHI holder  25  3.50  4.88  18  4.59  5.44 
Stenosis  176 (114)  9.28  5.97  144 (92)  9.11  5.80 
Insurance not asked for  51 (51)  9.55  5.83  37 (37)  10.30  5.70 
Insurance asked for  126 (63)  9.18  6.06  104 (52)  8.71  5.81 
  PHI holder  63  7.60  5.08  52  7.05  4.56 
  SHI holder  63  10.80  6.57  52  10.41  6.48 
Cervical Conization  335 (264)  6.70  4.37  221 (166)  6.72  4.46 
Insurance not asked for  188 (188)  6.89  4.66  108 (108)  6.81  4.73 
Insurance asked for  150 (75)  6.46  3.96  110 (55)  6.62  4.19 
  PHI holder  75  5.84  3.61  55  5.77  3.73 
  SHI holder  75  7.11  4.21  55  7.53  4.48 
Notes: 
1 Standard deviation; 
2 Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of hospitals; Au-
thors’ calculations. 
A total of 163 times, i.e. in 29 percent of all cases, the interviewers were 
asked for their health insurance type, which ensued a follow-up call to each 
of these hospital to obtain waiting times for a PHI holder. Waiting times are 
lower if hospitals do not ask for the insurance type of the patient (Table 1). 
This hints at overall lower capacity utilization in these hospitals as compared 
to those which actively investigated the insurance type of the patient. Table 
1 further shows that average waiting times clearly differ by the insurance 
type (Table 1). Private insurees wait on average 5.1 days, whereas SHI hold-
ers wait on average 2.9 days longer. Overall, the pattern of differences in 
waiting times, as described above, remains the same in the matched sub-
sample: Hospitals which have investigated the insurance type of the patient 
have on average higher waiting times than those who were not interested in 
this type of information. Also, PHI holders have shorter waiting times than 
SHI holders.  10  Christoph Schwierz, Ansgar Wübker and Björn A. Kuchinke 
Table  1  further  decomposes  waiting  times  by  each  clinical  condition. 
Clearly, the propensity to ask for the insurance status or not depends on the 
clinical condition. Patients with Weber B Fracture are asked relatively sel-
dom, patients with cervical conization are asked little more than half of the 
times  and  patients  with  stenosis  are  asked  relatively  often.  Accordingly, 
waiting times increase in the same order of clinical conditions. Short waiting 
times in case of Weber B Fracture will be most probably related to the oc-
currence of acute pain that patients with this clinical condition have to en-
dure. On the other hand, the relatively long waiting times for patients with 
stenosis and cervical conization may be explained by the lack of acute pain 
for these patients. The decomposition shows that within all diagnoses PHI 
patients  have  shorter  average  waiting  times  than  SHI  patients,  once  the 
hospitals ask for the insurance status.  
4.  Empirical strategy 
Our data collection design imposes a two-part decision process on hospitals: 
First, the decision whether to ask for the insurance status of a patient; Sec-
ond, the  proposal of a waiting time until the appointment. This  decision 
process can be appropriately modeled by a two-part model with a binary 
outcome model in the first step and a count data model in the second step, 
because waiting times are measured in full days.  
In the first step, we estimate the probability that a hospital asks for the pa-
tient’s insurance status: 
, ih i h h i ih D X pd T y e l d b g + + + + =                                                 (1) 
where  ih y  is 1 if a hospital asks for the insurance status of a patient and 0 
otherwise;  i T  is a vector of dummies denoting the weekday of the call for 
appointment; h pd  is the probability of default of hospital h of admittance;
 
h X  is a vector of other observed hospital and regional attributes;  i D is a 
vector of dummies of the patient’s clinical condition and  ih e is the random 
error. We estimate one model without the observed hospital characteristics 
to retain all available appointments and one with the subsample of data for 
which  hospital  characteristics  are  observable.  The  estimation  is  done  by 
probit models with standard errors corrected for clustering of observations 
within hospitals. 
In the second step, we estimate the association between the offered waiting 
times  and  our  observable  explanatory  variables.  In  order  to  account  for 11  Waiting Times for Holders of Private versus Social Health Insurance 
potential unobserved heterogeneity of hospitals, we first estimate a number 
of hospital fixed-effects models. For the waiting time  ih w
 
of patient i in 
hospital h we assume that:  
, ~ ~
ih h i i ih u T I c w e g a + + + + =                                                             (2) 
where c is a constant;  i I is a dummy for the insurance status of the patient, 
with 1 for a PHI and 0 for a SHI holder;  h u is a hospital fixed-effect and the 
other variables correspond to those used in equation (1). We are interested 
in the causal effect of insurance status on waiting times. 
We then continue to assess whether waiting times are associated with ob-
servable characteristics of hospitals within the sample of matched data. The 
model is then:  
.
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
ih i h h i i ih D X pd T I c w e l d b g a + + + + + + =                                             (3) 
Because hospital characteristics do not vary by the insurance type of pa-
tients, we forgo hospital fixed-effects in this model. Also, because of the 
small sample size we do not estimate separate models for each diagnosis. 
Finally, we estimate how observable characteristics of hospitals and patients 
are associated with differences in waiting times between PHI and SHI hold-
ers: 
,
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 1 0 0
ih i h h i i i i ih D X pd T T c w e l d b m m + + + + + + = D                                   (4) 
where  D  denotes the within-hospital difference in waiting times between 
PHI and SHI holders and 
0
i T  (
1
i T ) is a vector of variables denoting the 
weekday of a call for appointment for a SHI (PHI) patient. 
When estimating equations (2) to (4), we provide results for two samples of 
hospitals. First, we assume that hospitals not asking for the insurance type of 
the patient would have offered identical waiting times to both PHI and SHI 
holders.  Therefore,  for  this  subsample  of  appointments  we  duplicate  the 
number of observations and assign one half of the observations to SHI and 
the other half to PHI patients. We then pool this data with appointments for 
hospitals who have asked for the insurance type and use all in one regres-
sion. The strategy basically imposes a no discrimination constraint between 
PHI and SHI holders for the subsample of hospitals who did not investigate 
the insurance type.  Intuitively, the resulting estimates are conservative and 
could be, loosely speaking, a lower bound for the impact of insurance type 12  Christoph Schwierz, Ansgar Wübker and Björn A. Kuchinke 
on waiting times. Second, we restrict the data to only those hospitals who 
have asked for the insurance type of patients. In analogy to the pooled esti-
mate above, this estimate will yield an upper bound of discrimination, be-
cause it focuses on the subsample of hospitals which have an obvious inter-
est in the insurance type of their patients and can therefore discriminate 
easily.  
We estimate equations (2) and (3) by count models, because the offered 
waiting times are measured in full days. The usual procedure with two-part 
models based on count data is first to estimate the binary outcome as in 
equation (1). Then the positive counts are estimated separately based on a 
truncated-at-zero  count  data  model.  However,  our  data  is  special  in  the 
sense that zeros in the first step do not exclude a positive observation for the 
same individual in the second step. We therefore include the zero waiting 
times in the second step as well, comparing the results based on the Poisson 
model, the negative binomial model or zero inflated model (Cameron and 
Trivedi 1998). We have tested the best fit of the models by the Akaike in-
formation  Criterion  and  Bayesian  information  criterion.  Both  criteria  fa-
vored the negative binomial model for equations (2) and (3). Also, the LR-
test has confirmed that waiting times are overdispersed, which makes the 
negative  binomial  model  more  appropriate  than  the  Poisson  model.  The 
standard errors were corrected for clustering of multiple observations within 
the same hospital.  
Model (4) also includes negative integer values and was first estimated by 
ordinary least squares (OLS). However, tests indicating heteroscedasticity 
indicate that OLS is inefficient as compared to an estimation using a hetero-
scedasticity-consistent variance-covariance matrix of the error term. As the 
form of heteroscedasticity is unknown, we estimate the equation addition-
ally by feasible generalized least squares (Wooldridge 2002). For this pur-
pose we use the residuals  ih e from equation (3) after estimation by OLS. We 
then regress the log of the squared residuals  ( )
2 ln ih e  
on all explanatory vari-
ables by OLS, use the fitted values  ( )
2 ˆ ln ˆ ih ih g e º  
from this regression and esti-
mate (3) with weighted least squares and weights   ( ) ih ih g w ˆ exp- = .
 
5.  Results 
Estimation results of equation (1) are presented in Table 2. These confirm 
that the probability of being asked for the insurance status is significantly 
decreased  for  the  clinical  condition  Weber  B  Fracture  and  increased  for 
calls on stenosis relative to the clinical condition of cervical conization. Fur-
ther, calls later than Monday increase the probability of this outcome. In the 13  Waiting Times for Holders of Private versus Social Health Insurance 
subsample  of  hospitals  with  matched  data  the  only  additional  significant 
determinant of the assessed probability is being geographically located in 
East Germany.  
 
Table 2   
Determinants of the probability to ask for the patients’ insurance type  
  All hospitals  Matched data 
Independent Variables 
Marginal 
Effects  z-value  Marginal 
Effects  z-value 
Probability of default  -  -  -0.012  (1.01) 
For-profit hospital  -  -  0.690  (0.77) 
Private non-profit hospital  -  -  0.012  (0.19) 
#Beds  -  -  -0.004  (1.16) 
#Beds²  -  -  0.004  (1.58) 
Regional Capacity Utilization  -  -  0.157  (1.21) 
Regional Capacity Utilization²  -  -  -0.001  (1.18) 
East Germany  -  -  -0.251***  (3.68) 
Public subsidies  -  -  0.005  (1.56) 
Last PD before 2004  -  -  -0.069  (0.77) 
Diagnosis: Fracture  -0.161***  (3.68)  -0.219***  (3.60) 
Diagnosis: Stenosis  0.270***  (5.25)  0.232***  (3.55) 
Tuesday  0.141**  (2.21)  0.135  (1.55) 
Wednesday  0.149**  (2.23)  0.200**  (2.16) 
Thursday  0.119*  (1.85)  0.111  (1.29) 
Friday  0.217***  (2.78)  0.225**  (2.29) 
Pseudo R²  0.11  0.18 
Chi²-test for joint significance of beds  -  3.52 
Chi²-test for joint significance of  
capacity utilization  -  1.61 
Observations  561  373 
Notes: Estimates from probit models; Constant included; Standard errors corrected for cluster-
ing of observations within hospitals; constant included; ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5% and 
10% level respectively. 
 
Table 3 presents the marginal effects of PHI versus SHI status as well as the 
levels of statistical significance as modeled in equation (2), i.e. after account-
ing for hospital fixed-effects and the days of the calls for appointment. In 
the left part of the table, the conservative estimates are presented, where it 
is assumed that hospitals not asking for the insurance type offer identical 
waiting times to PHI and SHI patients. The right part of the table shows 
estimates for the subsample of hospitals investigating the insurance status. 
For the sake of brevity the estimates of the other covariates are omitted.  14  Christoph Schwierz, Ansgar Wübker and Björn A. Kuchinke 
First, in all estimation results PHI is related to shorter waiting times than 
SHI. Thus, clearly insurance status is a significant predictor of waiting times. 
The  average  effects  vary  between  the  conservative  and  non-conservative 
estimates as well as between diagnoses. The conservative estimate of -0.61 is 
more than 3 times lower than the estimate of -2.19 for the subsample of 
hospitals who have investigated the insurance status. This difference in es-
timates is mainly driven by the low propensity of hospitals to ask for the 
insurance status within the clinical condition of Weber B Fracture, such that 
the assumption of identical waiting times is reducing the overall effect of 
insurance status on waiting times.  
 
Table 3   
Marginal effect of PHI versus SHI on waiting times 
  All appointments
1    Insurance type asked for
2 
Sample  Obs.  Marginal  
effect 
z-value                  Obs.  Marginal  
effect 
z-value 
All diagnoses  1122  -0.61***  (5.02)    326  -2.19***  (6.05) 
Stenosis  212  -1.62***  (3.93)    128  -3.06***  (4.15) 
Weber B Fracture  365  -0.30**  (2.04)    52  -2.91**  (2.16) 
Cervical Conizati-
on  545  -0.38***  (3.32)    146  -1.43***  (3.48) 
Notes: 
1 All appointments and assuming identical waiting  for PHI and SHI holders in the sub-
sample of hospitals not asking for the insurance type; 
2 Subsample of hospitals asking for the 
insurance  type;  Poisson  model  including  hospital  fixed-effects,  the  weekday  of  the  call  for 
appointment and a constant; Standard errors corrected for clustering within hospitals; ***, **, * 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
 
Considering the magnitude of the effects, it is of course uncertain whether in 
the extreme case of a 3 day difference in waiting times, the relatively high 
waiting times for SHI patients would be detrimental to their health status. 
However, because in all clinical conditions patients get access to medical 
care mostly within the admissible range of waiting times, negative health 
effects are not very probable. 
In  Table  4,  we  investigate  whether  waiting  times  across  hospitals  can  be 
significantly explained by some of their observable attributes.  As before, 
the insurance status is a strong predictor of waiting times. Moreover, the 
hospitals’ PDs are positively related to waiting times. Out of the remaining 
explanatory variables only regional public subsidies, hospital size and the 
patients’ diagnoses are significantly related to waiting times on the 5 percent 
significance level in either of the both estimates. Thus, overall there are few 15  Waiting Times for Holders of Private versus Social Health Insurance 
observable hospital characteristics that are significant predictors of individ-
ual waiting times. 
 
Table 4   
Marginal effect of PHI versus SHI and hospital characteristics on waiting times 
  All appointments
1  Insurance type asked for
2 
Independent Variables  Marg. 
Effect 
z-value  Marg.  
Effect 
z-value 
PHI holder  -0.768***  (6.31)  -2.671***  (6.84) 
Probability of default  0.093*  (1.82)  0.287**  (2.27) 
For-profit hospital  0.753  (1.14)  -1.711  (1.17) 
Private non-profit hospital  0.888*  (1.91)  0.057  (0.06) 
#Beds  0.003  (1.21)  0.004  (0.92) 
#Beds²  -0.003  (1.56)  -0.006*  (1.82) 
Regional Capacity Utilization  -0.101  (0.13)  -3.107  (1.44) 
Regional Capacity Utilization²  7.0 E-04  (0.14)  0.019  (1.34) 
East Germany  0.415  (0.83)  1.281  (1.04) 
Public subsidies  0.004***  (2.62)  -0.027  (1.36) 
Diagnosis: Fracture  -6.021***  (9.08)  -4.921***  (3.04) 
Diagnosis: Stenosis  1.525***  (4.35)  2.280***  (3.57) 
Last PD before 2004  0.767  (1.44)  0.496  (0.44) 
Chi²-test (whole model)  217.20***  169.80*** 
F-test for joint significance of 
beds  3.69  14.26*** 
F-test for joint significance of  
capacity utilization  0.03  5.13* 
Observations  746  250 
Notes: 
1 Including only hospitals with waiting times for both PHI and SHI holders;  Negative 
binomial model; Standard errors corrected for clustering of observations within hospitals; 
constant and differences in weekdays of calls between PHI and SHI patients included;***, **, * 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
Finally, Table 5 presents the results of estimates of the difference in waiting 
times between PHI and SHI holders as in equation (3). The results show 
that for high PDs this difference is more positive. In other words, hospitals 
with a poor financial performance do not benefit PHI holders with lower 
waiting times as compared to SHI holders.  
To better understand the association between the PD on discrimination in 
waiting times between patient types, we graph the expected mean difference 
in waiting times for a range of values of the PD.  To this end, following the 
estimation results of equation (5) we set the PD at a given value and, using 
simulated  parameters  values,  we  generate  the  average  expected  waiting 16  Christoph Schwierz, Ansgar Wübker and Björn A. Kuchinke 
time, as well as the 95 percent confidence interval at each value of the PD.
12 
We draw 1,000 simulations of the estimated model parameters from their 
asymptotic sampling distributions. To generate the expected mean waiting 
times all variables other than the PD are set at their mean values. 
 
Table 5   





Insurance type asked 
for
2 
Independent Variables  Coeff.  t-value  Coeff.  t-value 
Probability of default  0.062**  (2.11)  0.434***  (2.64) 
For-profit hospital  -0.403  (1.10)  1.241  (1.60) 
Private non-profit hospital  -0.108  (0.40)  0.076  (0.69) 
#Beds  -0.001  (0.50)  -0.007**  (2.03) 
#Beds²  0.001  (0.64)  0.006**  (2.24) 
Regional Capacity Utilization  -0.610  (0.64)  -0.234  (0.09) 
Regional Capacity Utilization²  0.003  (0.70)  0.003  (0.26) 
East Germany  -2.574**  (2.10)  -4.580***  (2.64) 
Public subsidies  0.001  (0.16)  0.034  (3.72) 
Last PD before 2004  0.480  (1.47)  -2.131  (1.63) 
Diagnosis: Fracture  0.080  (0.32)  -1.911  (1.39) 
Diagnosis: Stenosis  -0.610  (1.24)  -0.361  (0.53) 
F-test (whole model)  3.77**  4.12*** 
F-test for joint significance of beds  0.62  4.93* 
F-test for joint significance of  
capacity utilization  1.00  7.82** 
Observations  373  125 
Notes: FGLS estimation results; Standard errors corrected for clustering within hospitals; 
vectors including days for call of appointment and constant included; tested for interac-
tions between PHI and ownership form / hospital size / diagnoses; ***, **, * significant at 
1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
Figure 1 presents the simulated expected values and the 95 percent confi-
dence interval of waiting times for the range of values of the PD. The left 
panel of the figure shows the linear relationship between PD and the de-
pendent variable for hypothetical values of the PD from zero to ten percent. 
The positive slope reveals that increasing values of the PD go along with 
relatively high waiting times of PHI as compared to SHI holders. Also the 
shape of the confidence interval illustrates that the degree of uncertainty 
regarding the simulated waiting times drastically increases once the differ-
ence in waiting times between PHI and SHI holders becomes positive. The 
right panel of the figure shows the difference in waiting times for the 1
st to 
                                                           
12 We use CLARIFY, a STATA add-on, for this purpose (Tomz et al. (2001), King et al. 
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the 99
th percentile of the actual PDs in the sample. The graph reveals that 
hospitals with a PD below one percent, which totals around 70 percent of all 
hospitals in our sample, tend to benefit PHI holders with relatively low wait-
ing times. Discrimination decreases for hospitals with PDs above one per-
cent.  
These result are intuitive, as hospitals with high PDs will tend to have low 
rates of capacity utilization or will therefore not discriminate between pa-
tients but rather give all of them equally fast access to their services. On the 
other hand, hospitals with a low PD will tend to utilize their capacity to a 
greater  extent  and  will  probably  try  to  increase  profits  by  discriminating 
between  PHI  and  SHI  holders.  This  may  be  achieved  by  a  management 
system for waiting lines, where offers of waiting times are based on medical 
and profit considerations. Unfortunately, we do not observe whether actu-
ally discriminating hospitals have a waiting line management and whether 
this system drives the PD. Therefore, it is not possible to establish a causal 
link between the discrimination in waiting times and the PD in our study. 
Figure 1   
Simulated differences in waiting times between PHI and SHI holders by levels of the probabil-
































































































































































































Dashed lines show 95-percent confidence intervals 
 
6.  Conclusion 
The main objective of this paper was to assess the causal impact of private 
(PHI) versus statutory health insurance (SHI) on offered waiting times until 
medical treatment in German acute care hospitals. Further, we assessed the 
association between observed hospital characteristics, such as the hospitals 18  Christoph Schwierz, Ansgar Wübker and Björn A. Kuchinke 
financial performance, and the discrimination in waiting times between PHI 
and SHI holders. 
First, the results show clear evidence of shorter waiting times for holders of 
PHI relatively to holders of SHI. Thus, access to medical stationary health 
care in Germany is asymmetrical w.r.t. the insurance status. The preferential 
treatment of PHI holders may be explainable by profit and cost considera-
tions. In Germany hospitals treating PHI holders profit from remuneration 
generated by additional services, which are often unavailable to SHI hold-
ers. Further, due to health insurance regulations, PHI holders tend to be a 
high income group, which is at lower risk of generating unremunerated costs 
for the hospital. Furthermore, PHI holders are more sensitive towards high 
waiting  times  than  SHI  holders.  Overall,  it  makes  sense  to  benefit  PHI 
holders  with  shorter  waiting  times,  as  this  ensures  potentially  more  and 
more profitable patients. Considering the magnitude of the effects, it is not 
possible to say whether even the high difference of 3 days in waiting times 
between PHI and SHI patients may damage the health due to longer waiting 
times. Most probably, however, it should not because most waiting times are 
in a medically acceptable range of time. 
Second, we find that hospitals benefiting private insurees with shorter wait-
ing times as compared to SHI holders have a significantly better financial 
performance than those abstaining from or with less discrimination. Hospi-
tals which perform financially well will most probably have higher rates of 
capacity utilization and will therefore not be able to admit all patients re-
quiring an appointment. Therefore, they will probably establish a manage-
ment of waiting lines and admit patients based not only medical but also 
profit considerations. Because it is more profitable to benefit PHI holder 
with short waiting times, the association between the financial performance 
and discrimination in waiting times is intuitive. Unfortunately, we do not 
observe whether actually discriminating hospitals have a waiting line man-
agement and whether this system drives the PD. Therefore, it is not possible 
to establish a causal link between the discrimination in waiting times and the 
PD in our study. 
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Appendix 
Table A1  
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Description  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Outcome           
Waiting time  Individual waiting time in days per 
patient until an appointment for a 
medical consultation. 
6.15  5.35  0  25 
Hospital characteristics         
Probability of default 
(PD) 
One-year probability of default for 
each hospital based on logit scores. 
1.28  2.12  2.8*E-4  14.31 
Private nonprofit 
hospital 
1 if private not-for profit hospital , 
0 otherwise 
0.40  0.49  0  1 
Private for-profit 
hospital 
1 if private for profit hospital , 0 
otherwise 
0.19  0.39  0  1 
Public hospital  1 if public hospital , 0 otherwise  0.41  0.49  0  1 
Number of beds/100 
(sq.) 
Number of beds/100 (squared)  3.53  2.52  1.00  16.15 
Last PD before 2004  1 if latest balance sheet data avail-
able before 2004, 0 otherwise 
0.13  0.34  0  1 
Regional characteristics         
Regional Capacity 
Utilization 
Regional capacity utilization on 
the level of the German Federal 
States by ownership type of the 
hospitals 
76.29  3.64  54.40  84.70 
East Germany  1 if hospital is situated in East 
Germany, 0 otherwise 
0.25  0.44  0  1 
Public subsidies  Ratio of the sum of public funds 
directed to basic reinvestment per 
bed in the Federal State related to 
the average value in East German 
as well as West German Federal 
States.  
1.00  0.21  0.74  1.30 
Diagnoses           
Diagnosis: Fracture  Weber B Fracture is the fracture 
of the ankle joint treated opera-
tively in surgical departments. 
0.27  0.45  0  1 
Diagnosis: Stenosis  Constriction of the coronary 
vessels treated by a stent implanta-
tion in cardiology departments 
0.29  0.46  0  1 
Diagnosis: Cervical 
conization 
Cervical conization is an operative 
treatment in gynaecology depart-
ments, when cancer is suspected 
0.44  0.49  0  1 
Notes: Authors’ calculations; Statistics on variables which were dropped from the model due to 
their statistical insignificance are not shown for the sake of brevity. 
 